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ABSTRACT
The hiring of goods and services is a critical activity for oil companies, so the availability of 
qualified suppliers is desirable. In Institutional Theory, the insertion of suppliers and relationship 
forms between them and the main agent may be analyzed from the perspective of the search 
for legitimacy by organizations in the organizational field. The Transaction Costs Economics, in 
turn, gives support to analyze opportunism and uncertainty in exchange relationships as factors 
that alter transaction costs. The study shows a case of insertion of local suppliers as an industrial 
concentration encouragement sponsored by the State, in which pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy 
strategies are used to gain legitimacy and to keep it. Although there are no clear gains associated 
with transaction costs, Petrobras did not demonstrate that reduction in transaction costs was a 
priority in this process. The accomplishment of its mission, which is legitimized in society, is placed 
as a priority, in a behavior that can be understood as the result of a political decision to adopt 
sub-optimal goals, which are better explained through an institutional perspective.
Key words: Institutional Theory, transaction costs, insertion of suppliers, oil and gas.
RESUMO
A contratação de bens e serviços é uma atividade crítica para as empresas petrolíferas, de forma 
que a disponibilidade de fornecedores qualificados é desejável. Na Teoria Institucional, a inserção de 
fornecedores e as formas de relacionamento entre estes e o agente principal podem ser analisadas 
a partir da perspectiva da busca de legitimidade por organizações no campo organizacional. A Eco-
nomia dos Custos de Transação, por sua vez, dá suporte para analisar o oportunismo e a incerteza 
em relações de troca como fatores que alteram os custos de transação. O estudo mostra um caso de 
inserção de fornecedores locais como uma forma de incentivo à concentração industrial patrocinada 
pelo Estado, no qual as estratégias de legitimação pragmática e cognitiva são usadas para ganhar 
legitimidade e mantê-la. Embora não existam ganhos claros associados aos custos de transação, a 
Petrobras não demonstrou que a redução dos custos de transação fosse uma prioridade neste processo. 
O cumprimento de sua missão, a qual é legitimada na sociedade, é colocada como uma prioridade, 
em um comportamento que pode ser entendido como o resultado de uma decisão política de adotar 
objetivos sub-ótimos, os quais são mais bem explicados através de uma perspectiva institucional.
Palavras-chave: Teoria Institucional, custos de transação, inserção de fornecedores, petróleo e gás.
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INTRODUCTION
The hiring of goods and services is a critical activity for 
large oil companies. The availability of qualified suppliers is 
desirable for any company, because it ensures greater competi-
tiveness in the hiring process, faster responses to operational 
requirements, and lower costs. Besides that, it’s interesting 
to qualify suppliers, especially in regions where there are few 
available options of specialist suppliers of goods and services.
The disclosure of Petrobras’ strategic planning envisaged 
investments of around U.S. $ 34 billion in the 2003-2007 
period1, with a major part of goods and services to be sup-
plied by foreign industry, since Brazilian industry would not 
be capable of meeting a demand of that magnitude. Thus, 
the Federal Government established the National Oil and Gas 
Industry Mobilization Program (PROMINP) with the objective 
of maximizing the participation of the national industry in the 
implementation of oil and natural gas projects.
The actions of PROMINP aim to identify opportunities, 
insert suppliers, increase productivity and develop a local park 
of goods and service suppliers for meeting the demand from 
oil and gas enterprises. Thus, actions are primarily designed to 
qualify the workforce and to build the capability of suppliers.
In Institutional Theory, the insertion of suppliers and 
relationship forms between them and the main agent may be 
analyzed based on the perspective of the legitimacy searched by 
organizations in the organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1999b; Oliver, 1990; Suchman, 1995). The Transaction Costs 
Economics, in turn, gives support to analyze the magnitude of 
opportunism and uncertainty in exchange relationships with 
local businesses, among other aspects, as factors that alter 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1989).
Thus, the purpose of the study was to identify the oc-
currence of different performances of Petrobras due to the 
insertion of local suppliers in the oil and gas production chain 
in the State of Rio Grande do Norte – Brazil.
The investigation is of a qualitative nature, and the 
collection of data was done in two stages. Firstly, secondary 
data were collected from Petrobras’ internal newspaper and 
Results Based Strategic Management Information System 
(SIGEOR) from the Brazilian Service of Support for Micro and 
Small Enterprises (SEBRAE). Then, nineteen semi-structured 
interviews were carried out with actors involved in actions 
of the program (seven interviews) and representatives of 
companies (twelve interviews). Suchman’s model (1995) 
was employed to make content analysis regarding legitimacy 
strategies, while fourteen categories associated with the 
variables assets specificity, bounded rationality and oppor-
tunism (Williamson, 1995, 1989) were employed to analyze 
transaction costs.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
OVERVIEW ON INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION
One of the first authors to discuss the location of indus-
tries and industrial concentration was Marshall (1982), indicat-
ing that there are a number of causes to location, especially 
physical conditions. The gains of industrial concentration, 
according to Marshall, are based on external economies, whose 
concept was introduced to explain why and how the industry 
location occurred and why and how small enterprises could 
become efficient and competitive.2
The external economies concept was incorporated by 
Krugman (1992), in whose view the concept is always complex 
from an analytical perspective and of difficult characterization. 
He proposes that “the geographic concentration arises, basi-
cally, from the interaction of rising incomes, transport costs 
and demand” (p. 20).
Schmitz (1997) takes up the discussion of concentra-
tion from Krugman’s analysis, proposing that local economies 
are not sufficient to explain the strength of clusters. Then, he 
presents the concept of collective efficiency, “the competitive 
advantage derived from local external economies and from 
joint action” (p. 9), the former being incidental, the latter 
built consciously. The joint action can occur with or without 
help from the government, but when the latter intervenes, it 
tends to be more effective if working with the private sector.
Porter (1993, p. 210) considers concentration as “part 
of the broader process by which the advantage is created 
and maintained”. He believes that through an evolutionary 
process many national characteristics influence the success 
of competitive enterprises, in the constitution of a complex 
system that culminates in the construction of national advan-
tage. Emphasis is given to the rivalry and the concentration of 
industry. The grouping provides, according to Porter, mutual 
support, which projects benefits forwards, backwards and 
horizontally, becoming a vehicle for maintaining the diversity 
among rivals and obstructing the entry of new firms. Porter 
argues that the State would have the role of providing national 
conditions, which combined with local conditions stimulate 
competitive advantage.
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND LEGITIMACY
The Institutional Theory is a centenary theory that had 
its first writings on the economy with valuable contributions 
from other sciences, especially sociology. Its draft began to be 
prepared at the end of the nineteenth century as a reaction to 
the hedonistic view of human behavior, which interprets the 
collective political and economic behavior as the aggregate 
result of individual choices. The key issue of institutionalism, in 
the perception of DiMaggio and Powell (1999a), is how social 
1 Data from a lecture given by the Director of Services of Petrobras in the National Organization of Petroleum Industry, on June 11, 2003. See material on http://
www.onip.org.br/arquivos/apresentacao_duque.pdf
2 Although Marshall’s work cited in this article is from 1982, the original work was published in 1890.
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choices are shaped, mediated and channeled by institutional 
arrangements.
Institutional theory focuses on the role of external 
institutions in decisions and organizational behavior. These 
institutions may include regulatory structures, agencies, laws, 
courts, professions, interest groups and public opinion. Accord-
ing to Scott and Christensen (1995, p. 310), “more than any 
other theoretical paradigm in social sciences, the institutional 
perspective emphasizes the importance of wider social context”. 
This includes non-local forces, historical, relational and cultural 
factors and models of organizations.
The literature on institutional analysis used to be clas-
sified in three institutional currents: the old institutionalism, 
based on the contributions of Veblen, Commons and Mitchell, 
the New Institutional Economics (NIE) of Coase, Williamson 
and North, and the neo-institutionalism current of Meyer 
and Rowan (Carvalho and Vieira, 2003; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1999a; Scott, 1995). The NIE, besides the institutional envi-
ronment, also considers the way in which private interaction 
shapes governance mechanisms. Then, among the aspects that 
can determine the governance structure someone could point 
out the specificity of assets.
All institutional currents give emphasis to institutional-
ization processes and isomorphism, which are central in the 
creation and perpetuation of durable social groups. For Davis 
et al. (2000), isomorphism is a restriction process which forces 
a unit in a population to be similar to other units that are 
in the same set of environmental conditions. According to 
Motta and Vasconcelos (2002), an institutionalized concept 
is something taken for granted that becomes an accepted 
truth for members of that group, inspiring their actions and 
social practices.
Meyer and Rowan (1999) deal with the question of iso-
morphism among organizations of a particular organizational 
field as a matter of myth reproduction. When reproducing 
institutionalized practices and procedures, organizations are 
increasing their legitimacy, even if sometimes it does not neces-
sarily represent effectiveness for the organization. In complex 
institutional environments, obedience to standards enables 
organizations to obtain legitimacy and the necessary resources, 
while the deviation from the requirements of institutionalized 
myths leads to failure, due to high costs incurred to acquire 
legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1999).
In the process of isomorphism, the pressures of the 
institutional environment take an isomorphic position on 
social institutions, which seek to adapt their structures and 
procedures to context expectations through coercive, mimetic 
or normative processes. According to Hall (2004, p. 260), the 
institutional perspective sees the organizational architecture 
“not as a rational process, but subject to external and internal 
pressures, leading organizations in a field to seem like the 
others, as time passes”. Davis et al. (2000) cite the example 
of multinational companies that choose different modes to 
enter into new markets according to the levels of internal and 
external isomorphic pressures.
One of the contributions of institutional theory is the 
enlargement of the concept of environment. Scott and Meyer 
(1999) discuss the existence of technical and institutional 
environments: the technical environments are those in which 
production is made, goods and services are exchanged and 
where organizations are rewarded by an effective control 
of their production systems. The institutional environments 
are those “characterized by rules and requirements to which 
individual organizations must adjust, if they wish to receive 
support and legitimacy" (Scott and Meyer, 1999, p. 170). The 
two environment types exert pressure on the organizations with 
different characteristics and add a greater deal of legitimacy 
in terms of meeting the requirements and rules.
DiMaggio and Powell (1999a, p. 68) combine the orga-
nizational environments to cultural elements, “that is, beliefs 
and consolidated widely promulgated rules that serve as pat-
terns of organization”. The institutional reproduction is linked 
to the institutional power of central actors, such as the State, 
the professions or other agents, who can make their demands 
within the prevailing organizational areas.
DiMaggio and Powell (1999b) define three types of 
isomorphism: the coercive, which results from formal and 
informal pressures from other organizations and the cultural 
expectations of society; the mimetic, that is, the reproduction 
of models in response to uncertainties; and the normative, 
which occurs in response to professionalism.
An important concept for the discussion of environments 
is the organizational field. DiMaggio and Powell refer to the 
organizational field as a set of organizations that “constitute 
a recognized area of institutional life: the main suppliers, 
resources and products consumers, regulatory agencies and 
other organizations that produce similar services or products” 
(1999b, p. 106).
It is perceived, thus, that in an organizational field 
organizations seek not only results related to the technical 
field, but another factor that is also important is the social 
acceptance of the structures and procedures adopted, which 
will lead to legitimacy. According to Scott (1995, p. 45-46), 
from an institutional perspective, legitimacy “is not a commod-
ity to be owned or transacted, but a condition that reflects 
cultural alignment, normative support, or line with relevant 
rules or laws” and “refers to the degree of support of a cultural 
organization”.
Suchman (1995, p. 574) defines legitimacy as a “gen-
eralized perception or assumption that the actions of an en-
tity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. 
In his view, studies of legitimacy can be divided into two 
groups: the strategic one, which “adopts a managerial per-
spective and emphasizes the ways in which organizations 
instrumentally manipulate and deploy evocative symbols in 
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order to garner societal support”, and the institutional type, 
which “adopts a more detached stance and emphasizes the 
ways in which sector-wide structuration dynamics generate 
cultural pressures that transcend any single organization’s 
purposive control” (p. 572). While the strategic view takes 
legitimacy as an operational feature that organizations draw 
from their cultural environments and employ in the pursuit 
of their goals, institutional researchers describe it as a set of 
constitutive beliefs.
Suchman (1995) classifies legitimacy in three types: 
pragmatic, which involves exchanges among organizations and 
the audience and is more practical about the character of the 
consequences of organizational behavior; moral, which is as-
sociated with the acceptance of organizations’ moral conduct, 
in a way that their actions are evaluated as the right thing to 
be done; and cognitive, which is associated with the acceptance 
of organizational practice based on cultural models. Finally, 
the author proposes a typology for strategies focused on the 
legitimacy, where the organizational actions are arranged 
in a matrix according to the objectives of the action (gain, 
maintenance or repair of legitimacy) and the type of involved 
legitimacy (pragmatic, moral or cognitive).
TRANSACTION COSTS ECONOMICS
The origin of TCE is associated with Coase (1937), who 
explains the reason for firms’ existence. He criticized the 
economist’s neoclassical view about the economic system, 
because they accepted just the price as a governance mecha-
nism. In the neoclassical view, little activity of planning was 
imputed to individuals, who would do their choices from 
the alternatives available. Coase considers that in a system 
governed by prices, as in the view of neoclassical economists, 
there would not be a necessary organization of production 
by entrepreneurs. That is a different situation from what in 
fact occurs, where the presence of firms replaces the price 
mechanism in the organization of production. Coase shows, 
then, that the analysis of transaction costs in the economy 
determines the organizational forms and institutions of the 
social environment.
Coase’s ideas are then taken by Williamson in his formu-
lation of TCE, which does not see the company as a production 
function, but as a governance structure (Williamson, 1989), and 
the question of economic organization as “a hiring problem”. 
Thus, given the need to perform a task, with the possibility 
of several alternative forms of organization, it is essential to 
know the costs involved (Williamson, 1989).
TCE’s assumption about human being is that he is subject 
to be rationally bounded and prone to opportunism. Bounded 
rationality implies that human agents are intentionally rational, 
but only in a limited way. An opportunistic approach, in turn, 
argues that “human agents do not reliably fulfill their promises, 
but will violate the letter and spirit of an agreement where it 
suits their purposes” (Williamson, 1989, p. 389). The problem 
of economic organization, on the basis of these two assump-
tions, would be the creation of “governance and engagement 
structures that have the purpose and effect of saving the 
bounded rationality, while defending the transactions of the 
dangers of opportunism” (Williamson, 1989, p. 10). The concur-
rent existence of bounded rationality and risk of opportunism 
with assets specificity makes the hiring process fail through 
planning, promise and competition, giving rise to governance 
mechanisms to mediate transactions (Williamson, 1989).
Williamson (1989, p. 57) treats opportunism as a be-
havior that “refers to incomplete or distorted disclosure of 
information, especially to premeditated efforts to conduct 
to misunderstanding, to distort, to hide, to obscure or to 
confuse”. It also takes the obvious, subtle and natural ways 
(Williamson, 1995). Williamson does not support the argument 
that individuals are always opportunistic, but believes that 
“some individuals are opportunistic sometimes and that the 
differential reliability is rarely transparent ex ante” (1989, p. 
73). Since it is not easy to identify individuals prone to op-
portunism, safeguards are adopted in order to reduce the risk 
of transactions with these agents. According to Barney and 
Hesterly (2004, p. 135) “there is a cost to distinguish those 
who are prone to opportunism from those who are not”. So, the 
point is to protect the transactions using ex ante safeguards 
to prevent ex post opportunism.
According to Williamson (1989), the ex ante costs in-
clude preparing and negotiating agreements, and the ex post 
costs include installing and operating governance structures 
to monitor and resolve disputes, in other words, the cost to 
ensure the perfect accomplishment of the contract. In practice, 
there is a great interdependence between ex ante and ex post 
costs. It is also very difficult to quantify them, so they are 
evaluated on the basis of their amount, comparing hiring modes 
with each other. “What matters is the difference between the 
transaction costs, rather than its absolute magnitude” (Wil-
liamson, 1989, p. 32).
Concerning governance structures, the market appears 
to be more efficient when the transactions are recurrent, 
as we can notice in cases of mature industries. In general, 
transactions involving non-specific assets and in which there 
is no risk of opportunism are made under this structure (Wil-
liamson, 1989). However, the market is unable to meet all 
transactions demanded by organizations, especially when: the 
perfect competition conditions are not found; the transactions 
become more frequent and complex, which increases costs to 
conduct and monitor transactions; or when “the boundaries of 
a firm expand to internalize transactions and resource flows 
that were previously conducted in the marketplace” (Powell, 
1990, p. 303).
The hierarchical structure, also called vertical integra-
tion, is an option when there are market failures. According to 
Powell (1990), the normative basis in the hierarchy is found in 
employment relations, communications occur through routines, 
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conflicts are resolved administratively through supervision, 
the flexibility degree is low, the commitment among parties is 
from mid to high, the atmosphere is formal and bureaucratic 
and the choices of actors are dependent. Williamson (1989) 
points out the advantages of vertical integration, compared 
with the market, such as the possibility of making adjustments 
without the need to consult, complete or revise arrangements 
made among companies.
Assets specificity is the main reason for vertical integra-
tion. “As we increase the assets specificity, the balance is tilted 
in favor of internal organization” (Williamson, 1989, p. 97), or 
“the hiring in market leaves its post to bilateral contracting, 
which in turn is seen replaced by unified contracting (internal 
organization), as it gradually deepens the assets specificity” 
(p. 86). 
In addition to the conventional governance structures 
(market and hierarchy), TCE recognizes the intermediate forms. 
Williamson, in the early formulations, considered these struc-
tures unstable, but later he saw them as so frequent as mar-
kets and hierarchies (Barney and Hesterly, 2004). These forms 
constitute a range of options larger than classical alternatives 
of governance structures (Williamson, 1975).
Among the classical governance structures developed by 
Williamson (1975), a number of other alternatives have been 
employed to coordinate economic activities. International 
joint ventures, licensing and co-production agreements, joint 
research programs, exploration consortia and other coopera-
tive relationships between two or more potentially competitive 
firms have joined the modus operandi of the firms, presenting 
themselves as an alternative to the entry of international 
executives into new markets or lines of business. The new 
organizational forms are related to new patterns of organi-
zation of production, different mechanisms of coordination 
and control, as well as information and production systems 
and dissemination of knowledge in organizations (Baldi and 
Lopes, 2002).
The governance structures discussed above represent 
stylized models that help in understanding the diversity of 
economic arrangements found in today’s industrial world 
(Powell, 1990). From the TCE point of view, the choice of one 
of these structures is determined by transaction costs. On the 
other hand, institutional theory theorists pointed out that non-
reflexive issues are central in order to understand the decision 
process among different kinds of governance structures. Social 
and cultural norms and values are thought to play an important 
role in governance structure choice. Then, the choice of a set 
of governance structures is a consequence of economic and 
social-cultural elements of the environment. Legitimacy can 
be a determinant in this context.
RESEARCH METHOD
The research may be classified as qualitative (Richardson, 
1985), with a descriptive level (Oliveira, 1998).
The case study technique was employed, with strategy 
type 2, with a simple case and two analysis units (Yin, 2005). 
The case study may be undertaken as an intensive analysis of 
a single or a few real organizations and may have the purpose 
of exploration, description or practical goal. Usually, the pecu-
liar case poses problems, suggests conjectures, refutes them, 
illustrates a theory, but cannot generate it. Case studies are 
inspired on an empiricist doctrine, based on the conviction that 
an accumulation of facts will bring a satisfactory explanation 
of real situations. The case studies should not be limited to 
a description, but be supported by concepts and assumptions 
and be guided by a theoretical framework (Bruyne et al., 1977). 
Scott (1995) argues that qualitative and quantitative case 
studies are appropriate for the study of social processes, and, 
just as qualitative research, have long been used in the study 
of institutional processes.
In the case of suppliers’ insertion, the analysis unit was 
the action of inserting the supplier in the supply chain through 
PROMINP. As to the issue of legitimacy and transaction costs, 
the analysis unit was the relationship between Petrobras and 
the goods or services suppliers which have been included in 
the production chain through actions of PROMINP. The study 
covered a period of five years between 2003, PROMINP’s start-
ing year, and 2008, when the research project was completed.
DATA SOURCES AND COLLECTION
Data collection was performed in two stages. In the first 
stage secondary data from consultation from two sources 
were collected: Petrobras’ internal journal and Results Based 
Strategic Management Information System (SIGEOR) from 
the Brazilian Service of Support for Micro and Small Enter-
prises (SEBRAE), available on http://www.sebrae.com.br/uf/
rio-grande-do-norte/go/projects/. In both sources, since many 
other data were available, the focus was on information about 
PROMINP. The use of these sources was interesting because 
it allowed to complement the program characterization and 
served as a counterpoint to the perceptions of two important 
actors involved in the process of insertion: Petrobras and 
SEBRAE, which have an intensive interaction with local enter-
prises. The fact that the main author is a Petrobras employee 
enabled the choice of secondary data sources, as well their 
analysis.
In the second step, data were collected through nineteen 
semi-structured interviews (Gil, 1999; Hayman, 1984; Marconi 
and Lakatos, 2002), conducted mainly individually and at the 
interviewees’ institutions. The recorded interviews totalized 
16 hours and 33 minutes.
The interviewees were divided into two groups: the first 
group consisted of seven actors involved in the process of 
insertion of suppliers in the production chain, and included 
six individuals of different institutions that lead PROMINP. The 
seventh actor was Petrobras’ Manager of Operational Support, 
who is in charge of the activities of material purchasing and 
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contracting of services. To select individuals from this group, 
a previous survey was performed with the Executive Secretary 
of PROMINP in Rio Grande do Norte, in order to identify the 
main actors involved in actions of insertion. After starting data 
collection some individuals with low representation and par-
ticipation in the program were discarded from the interviews. 
So, interviews were conducted with seven individuals involved 
with the insertion of suppliers.
The second group consists of twelve executives of com-
panies involved in relations of service and supply of goods 
with Petrobras in Rio Grande do Norte. To select company 
leaders, initially we chose to work with companies located 
in Mossoró because this town concentrates more enterprises 
that benefited from actions of PROMINP (thirty-eight of a 
total of sixty-two). Within this group, a new selection was 
made according to activity type, which selected those whose 
activities involve transactions with specific assets. Additionally, 
at least one representative from each of these activities was 
chosen, giving preference to companies that have a tradition 
in providing services to Petrobras. The adoption of this criterion 
resulted in the selection of twelve companies.
DATA ANALYSIS
Interviews were literally transcribed for later analy-
sis. Through a triangulation technique their contents were 
confronted with secondary data collected. Data were broken 
down into smaller units and then grouped into categories 
related to each other in order to emphasize patterns, themes 
and concepts.
Information concerning the insertion of suppliers in 
the process enabled the characterization of PROMINP, the 
description of its actions and results, and the mapping of its 
institutional field of reference. With regard to legitimacy, it was 
made content analysis through the use of codes that allowed 
comparison with legitimation strategies identified by Suchman 
(1995). As to transaction costs we employed an analysis frame-
work with three variables and fourteen categories, based on 
Williamson (1975, 1989, 1995, 1996a), Allen (2006), Gorbaneff 
and Restrepo (2007) and Zaibet et al. (2005).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A CHARACTERIZATION OF PROMINP
PROMINP adopts a policy of minimum local content 
and may be inspired by the policy of substitute imports. The 
program’s philosophy is linked to the idea of local productive 
arrangements.
The program is implemented by the Mines and Energy 
Ministry (MME) and Petrobras. The latter, as a company partially 
owned by the State and the largest operator in the oil and gas 
sector in Brazil, is used to diffuse the program in the produc-
ing States. Many entities also participate in the program, such 
as the National Bank of Economic and Social Development 
(BNDES), the National Organization of the Petroleum Industry 
(ONIP), the Brazilian Institute of Oil, Gas and Biofuels (IBP) 
and the National Confederation of Industry (CNI). The Federal 
Government is the major program funder through MME.
The program’s governance structure is based on the 
creation of regional forums in the States, with coordination 
usually made by representatives of Petrobras, which also co-
ordinates the national PROMINP. The role of regional forums is 
“to meet the demands not mapped in the regional portfolio of 
investments in the sector, encourage the provision of goods and 
services by local industry and include small and micro enter-
prises in the oil and natural gas chain” (PROMINP, 2007, p. 3).
Furthermore, these forums serve as spaces for discussion 
at the regional level where, on the basis of the identification of 
oil and natural gas industry demands, opportunities for develop-
ment and training for local suppliers of goods and services are 
identified. The regional forums increase the program’s capillarity, 
“allowing the identification of new opportunities that contribute 
to increasing the local content” (PROMINP, 2007, p. 3).
The program focuses on capacitating providers of oil 
and gas production chain and operates in the States where 
the production of these energy sources occurs. By fomenting 
domestic industry based on competitiveness and sustainability, 
it encourages the formation of local productive arrangements, 
with Petrobras representing the State in the process. This is an 
industrial concentration encouragement case sponsored by the 
State where there is a generation of a specialized demand, the 
attraction of technical workers and the training of local work-
ers. The generation of external economies from the existence 
of spillovers (Marshall, 1982) favors the permanence of local 
companies and the installation of new entrants.
The program can also be explained as an attempt by the 
State to establish economies of scale arising from the interac-
tion of rising incomes, transport costs and demand (Krugman, 
1992), or the creation of demand and factor conditions (Porter, 
1993) to develop the oil and gas industry on the local level. 
Anyway, it is a process in which the government operates 
almost alone (Schmitz, 1997) to create the conditions that 
lead to industrial concentration.
Although the program has been originated from State 
action, its presence is not clearly perceived by the interviewees, 
and, when it is perceived, it is linked to the Federal Government, 
with little visibility of the State government and of actions 
by municipalities. Moreover, the institutional action of State 
and municipalities, when it does exist, is more reactive than 
proactive.
Petrobras is the great articulator of PROMINP. As the 
largest purchaser of the chain, it directs the agenda and the 
course of the program. Maybe for strategic reasons, like the 
fact that the company directly benefits from the inclusion 
of enterprises in the production chain, and due to statutory 
limitations in dealing with suppliers, Petrobras does not deal 
directly with companies within PROMINP, but through other 
institutions, such as SEBRAE, which promotes various actions 
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aiming to integrate suppliers, to articulate, and to encourage 
companies to participate in the program.
Educational institutions, in turn, format and operate 
courses addressed to workforce qualification. Outstanding 
among them are the Federal Center for Technological Educa-
tion (CEFET) and the National Service for Industrial Learning 
(SENAI). Universities have little participation in the program.
In the wake of PROMINP, Redepetro/RN was created, 
which is a company network formed under the coordination 
of a group of people from various institutions, mainly from 
CEFET and SEBRAE, aiming to articulate companies, research 
centers and support institutions, identify and exploit busi-
ness opportunities, generate business through the alignment 
of supply and demand, business training and technological 
development (Redepetro Folder).
Forty-five institutions were identified, forty being na-
tional and five international organizations, as members of the 
program’s institutional context of reference (Machado-da-Silva 
et al., 1999), which indicates that it is broad and complex. 
These institutions play different roles as representatives of the 
productive chain links, exert regulatory and legislative pres-
sure, meet the technical environmental demands, legitimate 
practices or provide symbolic demonstrations.
In this context there is strong participation of employ-
ers’ entities, with thirteen institutions. This reflects the range 
of the oil and gas production chain, which involves several 
segments, as well as the importance that these activities 
have for the performance of the sector. So, the actions of 
PROMINP cannot be designed only to meet the chain tip 
demands, represented mainly by Petrobras’ operations, but 
should consider the whole chain, under the risk of not resolv-
ing the existing bottlenecks.
There is also a great participation of institutions that ex-
ert regulatory and normative pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1999b) in terms of the regulation of activities, standardiza-
tion, certification and manpower qualification, with eleven 
institutions in these categories. This serves as a harbinger for 
the strong regulatory and normative character found in the 
organizational field under study.
The presence of technical-scientific reference institu-
tions, as well as some engineering research, may be explained 
as a response to demands of the technical environment (Scott 
and Meyer, 1999), while the mention of a consultancy may be 
seen as a symbolic demonstrations (Meyer and Rowan, 1999) 
associated with the compliance with ideals, which is a strategy 
of moral legitimacy (Suchman, 1995).
There is reference to internationally recognized institu-
tions, perhaps as a way of legitimizing the practice in the 
organizational field. The compliance with internationally ac-
cepted standards, such as the American Petroleum Institute 
(API) standards and certification processes through bodies such 
as Bureau Veritas (BV) and Det Norske Veritas (DNV) serves to 
expand the legitimacy to areas outside the national borders.
Two companies were quoted as references due to their 
practices in operation standardization and initiatives for social 
responsibility. They may be seen as those that disseminate 
rational myths in the organizational field under study (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1999).
So, the institutional context of PROMINP is broad and 
complex and constituted by institutions that justify their 
presence for several reasons, such as representing the supply 
chain segments, exerting regulatory and normative pressures, 
responding to technical environmental demands, legitimizing 
practices or providing symbolic demonstrations.
LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES 
ASSOCIATED WITH PROMINP
It was observed that legitimation strategies associated 
with pragmatic legitimacy and cognitive legitimacy are more 
present than strategies associated with general legitimacy and 
moral legitimacy. Also, these strategies are employed most 
notably to gain legitimacy and to a lesser degree to keep it. 
References to repair of legitimacy are negligible (Suchman, 
1995).
Regarding pragmatic legitimation strategies, it was ob-
served that the most frequent ones are those related to protect 
exchanges: stockpile trust, police reliability, and communicate 
honestly. These three strategies allow Petrobras to manipulate 
the environment, which it does through popularization and 
standardization of new models. In response, suppliers adopt 
the strategy of seeking certifications, while they absorb the 
organizational field culture, emanated mainly from Petrobras. 
The legitimation strategies’ interaction is shown in Figure 1.
Petrobras’ stockpiling of trust may be identified through 
the perception that the respondents believe that the company 
used to usually honors its commitments; carries honestly its 
bids; is very serious; works correctly and with honesty, in 
compliance with laws, rules and certifications. According to 
interviewees, Petrobras’ leading role gives more credibility to 
the program.
The strategy of communicating honestly has been in-
tensively used by Petrobras as a means to protect exchanges, 
as well as in the relationship with suppliers. This can be seen 
in the way that the company acted in the period in which it 
publicized the program, the company’s strategic planning and 
the diagnosis of their demand. Petrobras also communicates 
clearly to suppliers the requirements that have to be met to 
become a provider, as well as changes in the process of car-
rying out transactions with the company, which during the 
period covered by this article changed to e-procurement tools.
So, the combined effect of pragmatic legitimation strategies 
of stocking trust, policy of monitoring reliability and communi-
cating honestly allows Petrobras to manipulate the environment, 
allowing changes in the organizational field to be made under its 
control and reflecting its interests (DiMaggio, 1999).
The environment manipulation by Petrobras is made 
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through two strategies designed to gain cognitive legitimacy: 
popularization and standardization of new models. According 
to Suchman (1995), cognitive legitimacy, once established, is 
more elusive to obtain, more difficult to handle, more subtle, 
deeper and more self-sustaining. The cognitive legitimacy, once 
established, acts in the institutions’ interpretative schemes 
(Machado-da-Silva et al., 1999). Thus, the permanence of 
changes in the organizational field is acquired.
With the capillarity that Petrobras has with the other 
actors in the field, it disseminates the new standards. With 
the power that it has to exert coercive pressure it imputes new 
standards, which, if not followed, may entail penalties that can 
go as far as excluding a supplier from the chain. In this way, the 
company can create technical and institutional demands that 
define changes in the organizational field (DiMaggio, 1999; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1999; Scott and Meyer, 1999).
There are a lot of new models popularized by Petrobras. 
One of these is the new profile required from professionals, 
which induced the hiring of qualified workmanship, and the 
inclusion of women in the industry, which was rarely seen 
some decades ago. Another disseminated procedure was the 
adoption of stricter policies for Health, Safety and Environ-
ment (HSE), where the company made considerable efforts to 
disseminate its practices, making them widely known in the 
organizational field.
Regarding standardizing new models of strategy, Petrobras 
acted in order to standardize requirements for a company to 
become a production chain supplier, use of e-commerce tool for 
carrying out commercial transactions, and HSE requirements.
The results of the institutionalization process led by 
Petrobras can be seen more clearly in the adoption of cognitive 
strategies by suppliers to gain legitimacy through the choice 
of titles, specifically the quest for certification. Moreover, 
companies adopt models which are popularized and standard-
ized by Petrobras. Whether through coercive pressures or by 
mimetic behavior, they adapt themselves to the organizational 
field culture.
There is a great compliance of companies to the local 
oil industry culture. It seems that in order to participate in 
the organizational field it is not necessary only to meet re-
quirements that are formally documented, such as those from 
Petrobras, but also to incorporate socially accepted practices 
(Hatch, 1997).
The oil sector in the region was characterized as hav-
ing a culture with a strong presence of requirements relating 
to security, which requires that participants are prepared for 
emergency actions in certain situations, which works in very 
short times, requires care and rigor in operations and is strongly 
anchored in working with standards, quality and organization.
New companies in the field have difficulty to adapt 
themselves to the working mode, which is strongly absorbed by 
the companies involved in the chain. Standardized procedures 
disseminated among organizational field members act to force 
new entrants to adopt a mimetic behavior as a sine qua non 
survival condition.
PROMINP has been a strong tool for spreading the oil 
culture. In fact, the various institutions involved in the program 
produce a cultural mix resulting from the culture of each insti-
tution individually. The choice of the participating institutions 
should not be seen as made in a random way, but in tune with 
possibility of adding values to the sector’s culture.
RESULTS IN TRANSACTION COSTS
The variable assets specificity was operationalized 
through the following categories: place specificity, physical 
assets specificity, human assets specificity and dedicated 
Figure 1 – Interaction of legitimation strategies.
Source: Prepared by authors.
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assets. In order to categorize the physical assets specificity, 
we considered items identified by Petrobras as being of low 
competitiveness. This classification includes equipment supply 
and service provision items.
It was possible to identify some physical assets classified 
as specific to the production chain, such as mineral products, 
workover rigs, tugs, helicopters, tubes, industrial laundry and 
instruments maintenance and calibration services. Specific 
physical assets, however, are not the most critical ones for the 
chain. This position belongs to human assets, which represent the 
biggest bottleneck for the sector’s maintenance and expansion.
Because human assets constitute a critical specific as-
set, one option for Petrobras would be to internalize this asset 
in its hierarchical structure (Williamson, 1989). This shows, 
however, undesirable effects such as increase in trade union 
power, increase in expenditures with governance structure 
and reduction of mobility and flexibility to make changes in 
the labor force. One interviewee believes that “it is easier for 
Petrobras to replace a supplier than to replace an employee, 
because the labor laws are very protective, and it is more dif-
ficult for Petrobras to have flexibility by increasing labor. It is 
very easy to replace a company. Petrobras makes a contract 
dissolution and puts other company in the place” (E6).
There is a shared understanding that Petrobras hires 
professionals with good skills for its staff, mainly in key areas. 
On the other hand it outsources tasks to carry out activities 
that aren’t part of its core business. Its organizational structure, 
thus, transfers the dependency on internal employees to a very 
large dependence on outsourced human assets.
The dependence on specific human assets is not an 
exclusive practice adopted by Petrobras. Other companies in 
the region complain about the difficulty in finding and re-
taining professionals with the skills required by the industry. 
This lack of professionals in the market creates conditions for 
opportunistic behaviors, which may be minimized by actions 
of the program, once it qualifies professionals for functions in 
which there is a greater scarcity in the market. Some profes-
sionals that the market is not able to supply efficiently are 
maintenance electricians, electricity commissioners, drilling 
rig operators, industrial, mechanical, civil, electrical, and in-
strumentation project designers, and welding, pipelines, and 
painting inspectors.
Thus, considerations related to chain transaction costs 
should focus primarily on specific human assets and, second-
arily, on specific physical assets.
The variable bounded rationality was analyzed on the ba-
sis of both increase of uncertainty and reduction of uncertainty.
One factor that contributes to increasing uncertainty are 
short duration contracts and the so-called “umbrella contracts”. 
Short contracts involve uncertainty because the contracted 
firms do not usually know whether the contractors will continue 
providing services after the term. A new bid is usually made, 
without any differential treatment for those firms. Given the 
uncertainty, companies avoid investments in purchasing new 
equipment, as well as improving processes and technological 
improvements.
The “umbrella contracts” are characterized by a wide 
and varied scope of services, which are paid per unit price 
items. They are considered of high risk due to variability 
in the billing and the high share of fixed costs in the total 
cost of the company. Since it’s necessary to maintain a large 
structure during the entire contract period, any decrease in 
revenues may result in losses to the company. As a way to 
protect themselves, companies consider a higher risk factor 
and increase the prices of offered services.
The reduction of uncertainty is related to labor quali-
fication, business training, to the dissemination of Petrobras’ 
demand and its business planning, and clear specification of 
requirements in contracts.
Labor qualification reduces uncertainty by helping to 
improve technical capital, productivity and quality of services, 
increasing the chances of continuing the business relationship. 
Thus, by collaborating with the improvement of the workforce’s 
training, PROMINP increases the stability of contractual rela-
tions, since it reduces the uncertainty about the availability 
of specific human assets.
Business training, in turn, through training and process 
certification, enables businesses to develop standardization, 
prevision and control of activities that result in better prepared 
budgets. Thus, the chances of winning the bidding processes 
and of reducing the risk of contractual performance are in-
creased. Price reductions due to better control resulting from 
certification processes were recorded.
The dissemination of Petrobras’ demand and its business 
planning, however, was identified as the main action to reduce 
supplier uncertainty. According to respondents, access to this 
information mitigates risk, since it is possible to associate the 
services that are being contracted with Petrobras’ strategic 
objectives. Thus, the disclosure of such information enables 
companies to participate in bidding and make investments 
with greater certainty about the contract.
It may be concluded, therefore, for the variable bounded 
rationality, that there is a tendency to reduce the uncertainty 
in the sector over the covered period, which may contribute 
to transaction cost reduction.
The variable opportunism was operationalized through 
two groups of categories: one associated with safeguard in-
crease and the other with safeguard reduction. The concept 
of opportunism has been operationalized by authors such 
John (1984), Provan and Skinner (1989), and Achrol and 
Gundlach (1999), in order to make more evident the possibil-
ity of assessing the advantages and disadvantages of different 
governance structures. In this work, the logic adopted is that 
safeguard increase is a preventive measure against high risk of 
opportunistic behavior and, therefore, indicative of increasing 
transaction costs. Safeguard reduction, in turn, is indicative of 
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a lower risk of opportunistic behavior and of transaction costs 
reduction. It was observed that there is a tendency to increase 
safeguards in order to avoid opportunistic behavior.
Categories associated with safeguard increase measures 
were: adoption of more complex contracts, shorter contracts, 
and reduction of both trust and dependence. Of this group, the 
most cited ones were more complex contracts and reduction 
of dependence.
Petrobras has extended contractual requirements re-
garding manpower qualification, certification of process and 
evidence of compliance with labor obligations. There is an 
understanding that these requirements increase business costs, 
which are transferred to Petrobras.
Regarding reduction of dependence, the understanding 
is that Petrobras depends very much on its suppliers, but it 
tries to find alternatives to reduce this dependence through 
its high bargaining power, the great number of suppliers and 
its presence throughout the national territory. On the other 
hand, local suppliers depend almost exclusively on Petrobras 
for the continuity of their business activities.
Even with this high bargaining power, Petrobras needs 
to have more companies registered, mainly due to the exis-
tence of specific assets in the various regions where it oper-
ates. Thus, the expansion of local suppliers may be seen as a 
broader strategy to reduce the dependence on outside and 
local suppliers. This enables reduction in operation costs and 
allows faster response in emergency situations and in case of 
a failure by large suppliers.
Categories associated with safeguard reduction were: 
less complex contracts, longer contracts, increase in trust and 
increase in dependence. In this group, the category increase of 
dependence was the one most cited. The other categories had 
a negligible number of citations. This is an interesting result, 
since the category that deals with dependence reduction was 
also mentioned with high frequency, as already discussed. This 
shows that there is no consensus in the industry about the 
effect that the insertion of suppliers produces in the degree 
of Petrobras’ dependence.
It can be concluded, therefore, for the variable opportun-
ism, that there is a tendency to safeguard increase in order 
to avoid opportunistic behavior in the sector over the period 
considered, which may contribute to increasing transaction 
costs. This trend is materialized mainly through the increase 
in contractual requirements and initiatives for reducing de-
pendence on suppliers. Scholars have pointed to the use of 
safeguards as a means of reducing the tendency toward op-
portunism. Achrol and Gundlach (1999) specifically evaluate 
the use of contractual and social safeguards as a means of 
mitigating opportunism. Chiles and McMackin (1996) follow 
the same line of thought, emphasizing the increase in trans-
action costs due to adoption of safeguards and pointing to 
the increase of trust as an alternative to reduce such costs.
For a comprehensive analysis of transaction costs trends 
in the sector, table 1 shows the behavior of transaction costs 
depending on the combination of the variables bounded 
rationality and opportunism, in a scenario of existence of 
high-specificity assets.
It is possible to perceive that in an environment where 
there is a simultaneous occurrence of uncertainty and safe-
guard increase, the transaction costs tend to increase. In 
contrast, the reduction of uncertainty and safeguards creates 
a tendency of towards decreasing transaction costs.
Where there is uncertainty increasing and safeguard 
decrease, or uncertainty decrease and safeguard increase, it 
is not possible, a priori, to predict transaction costs behavior. 
In these scenarios, further investigations are required in or-
der to identify the variable with greater influence and, then, 
understand the behavior of those costs. Studies that analyze 
transaction costs considering that there are changes in just 
one variable (ceteris paribus condition) have their limitations, 
because they are not representative of situations encountered 
in the real world. Williamson (1995), e.g., analyzes the adoption 
of safeguards as a determinant of transaction costs, as they 
influence the risk of opportunism, but does not consider the 
character of this framework with dynamic changes in bounded 
rationality. Williamson (1989) recognizes the incompleteness 
of TCE, pointing out as one of its shortcomings the partiality 
of employed models. Child and Faulkner (1998) call attention 
to the static character of TCE analysis.
In this study, it was observed that there is reduction of 
uncertainty and safeguard increase, which complicates the 
analysis of the result of the combination of these variables in 
Table 1 – Combined effect of changes in bounded rationality and opportunism on transaction costs.
Variable
Effect in transaction costs
Bounded rationality Opportunism
Increasing uncertainty Increasing safeguards Increasing
Increasing uncertainty Decreasing safeguards Undefined
Decreasing uncertainty Increasing safeguards Undefined
Decreasing uncertainty Decreasing safeguards Decreasing
Source: Compiled by authors.
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transaction costs behavior. Further studies would be needed to 
determine such costs behavior. Considerations of institutional 
character shed new light on the problem, helping to decipher 
it (Oliver, 1990, 1996; Roberts and Greenwood, 1997). Zawis-
lak (2004) argues that companies’ assets are adaptable to a 
tangle of institutional events and the less suited the asses are 
to this mess, the higher will the transactions costs be. Thus, 
since there is a strong adaptation process of institutions in 
the studied organizational field, it’s possible to say that an 
isomorphic behavior contributes to transaction costs reduction.
CONCLUSION
The results of PROMINP are of great magnitude and ex-
tent and also encourage the increase of participation of local 
companies in the oil and gas production chain on a competitive 
and sustainable basis, according to the program’s goal.
The institutional context of reference of the program is 
broad and has the presence of significant national and interna-
tional institutions which provide the beliefs, rules and cultural 
norms that guide the program. PROMINP, thus, responds to 
coercive, normative and regulatory pressures of the organiza-
tional field, adapting itself to the expectations of the context.
From the point of view of legitimation, through strate-
gies to gain cognitive legitimacy and maintain pragmatic 
legitimacy, Petrobras manipulates the environment, ensuring 
the program participants’ conformity to its technical and 
institutional demands. Besides that, the cognitive legitimacy 
ensures that models institutionalized by Petrobras remain in 
the organizational field for a longer time. This manipulative 
conduct is not stressed by neo-sociological institutionalist 
authors, but is central in old institutionalism, specifically in 
Selznick’s work.
Enterprises respond to organizational field demands 
through compliance with technical requirements, primarily 
through processes certification, and cultural changes. The Re-
depetro/RN, fostered and created on the basis of the interaction 
of PROMINP participants, presents itself as a viable alternative 
to the continued participation of companies in the chain, on 
PROMINP’s institutionalized basis, even after the termination 
of the program. In other words, the network would take on 
the institutionalizing role of the field, but in this case the 
isomorphic pressures would change from being normative and 
from PROMINP into being mimetic and coercive, and would 
be exerted by Petrobras and other enterprises in the chain.
There are no clear gains associated with transaction 
costs, since in the relationship between Petrobras and its 
suppliers there is an increase in safeguards adoption simul-
taneously to a decrease in uncertainty, making it difficult to 
analyse the effect on the behavior of those costs. However, 
Petrobras did not demonstrate that reduction on transaction 
costs was its priority in this process. The accomplishment of 
its mission, which is legitimized in society, is placed as a prior-
ity. This behavior may be understood as a result of a political 
decision to adopt sub-optimal goals, i.e. a strategy aligned 
to the concept of inefficiency by design (Williamson, 1996b, 
1999, 2000). On the other hand, gains in legitimacy can be 
seen as an accumulated capital that can serve as a distinctive 
competition factor that generates economic gains.
In terms of theoretical findings, we can conclude that 
Institutional Theory presents complementary explanatory 
power for actions that are also explained in economic terms. 
Thus, it may be used as a theoretical support concurrent with 
other theories, such as TCE. Albeit the TCE model may explain 
the program’s actions, the ultimate goals of actions taken by 
Petrobras are better explained from an institutional perspective.
For future studies the authors suggest the use of quanti-
tative analysis, especially as regards transaction costs analysis, 
and the use of Brazilian authors to mix institutional dominant 
discourse with local reality. In the same way, a historical study 
with emphasis on the trajectory of Brazilian industrial devel-
opment and the creation of Petrobras may bring important 
elements to understand the phenomenon.
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